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Do Divorce Law Reforms Matter
for Divorce Rates? Evidence
from Portugal
Clarisse Coelho and Nuno Garoupa*
The effect of divorce law reforms on divorce rates in the United States and
elsewhere has generated a controversy in the law and economics literature.
In this article, we study the contribution of divorce law reforms for the
evolution of divorce rates in Portugal over the last 40 years. We focus on the
reforms of divorce law in the 1970s and in the 1990s as well as socioeconomic factors as determinants of the divorce rate. We find that the introduction of a modern divorce law in the 1970s had a significant effect on the
divorce rate, but the changes of the 1990s that effectively implemented a
generalized no-fault regime had no statistically significant impact. Our
observations suggest that the reforms in the 1990s were likely the response
of the legislature to growing divorce rates rather than the cause.

I. INTRODUCTION
Since Becker's original contribution (Becker 1973, 1974; Becker et al. 1977),
the economic theory of marriage and divorce has focused on a controversial
question, namely, the effect of legal reforms on the rates of marriage and
divorce. In the United States, the question concerns the relationship
between a regime of no-fault divorce (most states passed no-fault divorce laws
in the 1970s) and a rising rate of divorce.'

*Address correspondence to Nuno Garoupa, School of Economics and Management, Universidade Nova de Lisboa, Campus de Campolide, P-1099 032 Lisbon, Portugal. Clarisse Coelho,
Universitat Pompeu Fabra. Nuno Garoupa, Universidade Nova de Lisboa, FEDEA, Madrid,
CEPR, London.
'An excellent overview is provided by Mechoulan (2005). He also takes notice of no-fault
grounds for divorce and no-fault regimes for property settlements and alimony. In no-fault
grounds for divorce, divorce proceedings can be initiated without any proof of wrongdoing,
©2006, Copyright the Authors
Journal compilation ©2006, Cornell Law School and Blackwell Publishing, Inc.
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Under a Coasian approach (Peters 1986; Scott 1990), changes of
regime should not affect the efficient outcome of bargaining between
spouses if transaction costs are low, though they certainly modify the relative
bargaining position and, as a consequence, expected payoffs for each
spouse. In other words, for example, unilateral divorce simply reassigns
existing property rights between spouses with no consequence in terms of
efficient outcome if transaction costs are low.
Several economists have pointed out why this line of reasoning might
not be very convincing. The major problem is that transaction costs are high
and opportunism is likely in the context of divorce litigation (Brinig &
Crafton 1994). Other arguments on why a Coasian approach fails (and
consequently why changes in law do matter for divorce rates) include high
divorce filing and litigation costs, informational constraints (Allen & Brinig
1998; Smith 2001; Weiss & Willis 1997), gender differences over life-time
contributions (Cohen 1987), the nature of the threat point on divorce
bargaining (Lundberg & Pollak 1996; Wax 1998), indivisibilities, including
the quasi-public nature of children (Dnes 1999; Weiss & Willis 1985, 1993;
Zelder 1993), and problems related to implementing expectation damages
(Bowles & Garoupa 2002; Dnes 1998) or unconstrained transfers between
spouses (Fella et al. 2004).
Both sides of the controversy accept that moving from a fault to a
no-fault regime of divorce might have a positive impact on divorce rates in
the short run, but there is no consensus concerning long-run effects. It is an
issue that requires empirical analysis. Unfortunately, the empirical results do
not point toward a definite answer (Mechoulan 2005). Some suggest that
no-fault divorce laws had little impact on divorce rates, but others suggest
that such laws did have an impact.
Brinig and Buckley (1998) present an empirical analysis of the determinants of state divorce levels in the period 1979-1990 for 49 states (Nevada
is excluded), including no-fault and fault states. Their main result is that
divorce levels are positively and significantly correlated with no-fault laws.
The change to no-fault divorce laws resulted in increased divorce levels.
These results are confirmed by Friedberg (1998). She uses panel data and

neither spouse is considered responsible for the breakup of the marriage, and neither spouse
has to prove that the other spouse did something wrong. A fault divorce is one in which one
party blames the other for the failure of the marriage by citing wrongdoing. Fault divorces are
most common where abuse is a factor. Abandonment, desertion, inability to engage in sexual
intercourse, insanity, and imprisonment are other causes for fault divorces.
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controls for state effects. She concludes that divorce law reforms do not
appear to be endogenous and that unilateral divorce laws had a permanent
effect on divorce behavior.
However, Ellman and Lohr (1998) contest some of these findings,
arguing that the observed increase in divorce rate is explained by other
variables (they argue that divorce rates started increasing before legal
changes had taken place in almost all states) rather than changes in law.
These authors assess the relationship between divorce law and divorce rates
by identifying three factors: general trend in divorce rates; large regional
effects; and a dip-followed-by-peak pattern. They argue that legal changes
resulted in a short-term increase in the divorce rate (one or two years) but
there is no evidence of any long-term effect. Their explanation relies on the
fact that divorce law reform is endogenous and societal forces contributed to
both the increase in divorce rates and changes in the law.
More recent work tries to reconcile both sides. Wolfers (2006) considers the dynamic response of divorce rates, adding careful controls to distinguish short-run versus long-run effects of law changes. He shows a positive
effect on the first decade, and a substantial reverse over the next decade.
Rasul (2006) looks at effects on age cohorts. He concludes that unilateral
divorce improves quality of matching and affects duration of marriages
celebrated under previous regimes.
In Canada, Allen (1998) has shown there was an impact on divorce
rates, the actual magnitude being more controversial, following the federal
Divorce Act of 1968.2 In Europe, empirical evidence regarding the effects of
divorce law reforms is scarce. Binner and Dnes (2001) present a time-series
approach to the problem in the United Kingdom. They conclude that law
reforms in the United Kingdom (Legal Aid Act of 1949 and Divorce Reform
Act of 1969 operational only in 1971) did have a positive long-run effect on

2

Before 1968, Canadian divorce law varied from province to province. Adultery was the sole

ground for divorce in most provinces, except in Nova Scotia, where cruelty was an additional
ground. Spousal support was typically an obligation that could be imposed only on a guilty
husband in favor of his innocent wife. However, the Divorce Act of 1968 introduced nationwide
no-fault grounds (in addition to fault grounds) for divorce, and established equality in support
rights and obligations between men and women. Canada's current divorce law came into effect
inJune 1986. This federal law sets forth the grounds for divorce (which are both non fault and
fault based) and the criteria for spousal and child support and custody of and access to children
on or after divorce that apply throughout Canada. The standards for property distribution on
divorce fall outside of the Divorce Act, however, and are regulated by provincial or territorial
legislation.
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Figure 1: Log divorce rate (divorce rate measured per 1,000 of population)
1960-2002.
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divorce rates.' Smith (2002) looks at different European countries and
observes that variations in religious influence and women's economic status
seem to play an important role in explaining differences across countries.
Other important factors include the existence of legal-aid schemes providing
financial assistance and costly administrative processes.
In this article we develop a time-series econometric model to explain
the growing divorce rate in Portugal for the period 1960-2002 using the
methodology developed by Binner and Dnes (2001). We study the effect of
divorce law reforms in Portugal on divorce and marriage rates and assess our
findings in light of possible alternative sociolegal explanations.
Divorce rates in Portugal have increased steadily in the period 19602002 (Figure 1), whereas marriage rates increased until the mid-1970s, but
have decreased in the last 20 years (Figure 2). A sudden change in divorce

3

Divorce in England and Wales is currently granted on the basis of the irretrievable breakdown
of marriage. The Family Law Act of 1996 would have amended the law in quite significant ways
but it now appears that many of its provisions may never be brought into effect. There are
currently five grounds that can be relied on as evidence of irretrievable breakdown: adultery,
unreasonable behavior, desertion, two years' separation with consent, and five years' separation
without consent.
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rates is noted after 1975, minor peaks are observed in 1985, 1992, and 1994,
and a new major peak is observed after 1996. The 1975 and after 1996 peaks
appear to coincide with the two major divorce law reforms in Portugal, the
1975 Divorce Law and the 1995 Code of Civil Registration (Appendix A
summarizes information concerning divorce law reforms in Portugal). The
main sociolegal explanations for changes in divorce rates rely precisely on
the reforms of divorce law in 1975 and in the mid-1990s. These explanations,
however, do not provide any serious econometric analysis, but, rather, a
combination of sociological theory with descriptive statistics.
The time-series econometric analysis is developed in Section II and
final remarks are addressed in Section III.

II.

TIME-SERIES ANALYSIS

This article follows the methodology of Binner and Dnes (2001). We start by
looking at stability of the time series (Dickey-Fuller and augmented DickeyFuller tests). We then test for co-integration using a full-information
maximum-likelihood procedure (Johansen test with Reimers's adjusted critical values for small samples). Finally, we present results for the short-run
dynamic error-correction mechanism. The software we used is Eviews version
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A. Data
The data are limited. We have only 43 annual observations for divorce and
marriage rates (measured per 1,000 of population). Explanatory factors are
of three types: economic, social, and technological. For economic explanatory factors, we expect divorce to be positively influenced by an increase in
wealth and higher female average wage. Unfortunately, there are no available data concerning female average wage as well as female participation in
the labor market (these data are available for only the last 20 years). We
include GDP per capita to take into account the wealth effect, although
recognizing the limitations of such measure.4
With respect to social explanatory factors, divorce should be positively
affected by the development of new social norms, in particular, the progressive secularization of Portuguese society. As proxies for less compliant behavior with Catholic rules (by which divorce is strictly forbidden), we use the
rate of birth out of wedlock and the rate of Catholic marriages.'
Finally, by technological explanatory factors, we mean the medical
improvement of conditions under which women give birth. We use the rate
of infant mortality as a proxy. A higher rate of infant mortality implies that
women must give birth more often in order to assure adult descendants, thus
decreasing the likelihood of divorce due to the need of men and women to
secure a longer-term marriage. Another variable we would like to include,
fertility control, unfortunately is not available. 6
Logarithmic transformations have been applied to all variables. Appendix B summarizes the data used in our econometric analysis, including a
detailed description and sources. Two dummy variables are used to capture
the 1975 Divorce Law and 1995 Code of Civil Registration. Since some
aspects of these laws were not implemented and made operational until
some years after their approval, DUMMY75 has a value of 1 in 1975, 1976,
1977, and 1978 and 0 otherwise, DUMMY95 has a value equal to 1 in 1995,

4

As a proxy for the improving conditions of women in the labor market, we used the percentage
of women among university students, but it was not statistically significant in any econometric
specification.
We also included urbanization (percentage of the population living in towns and cities with
more than 40,000 people), but it was not statistically valid in any econometric specification.
'We decided not to include fertility rate. It is likely endogenous with the divorce rate. Not only
does more divorce reduce the time together to have children, but the anticipation of a higher
divorce probability also reduces people's willingness to invest in marital public goods.
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Table 1: Stability of Series Dickey-Fuller and Augmented Dickey-Fuller
Tests 1960-2002
Variable

Dickey Fuller Test

Augmented Dickey Fuller Test (2 Lags)

Log divorce rate
Log marriage rate

-1.695
-2.231

-2.461
-2.515

Log Catholic marriage
Log rate of birth out of wedlock

-1.621
-4.224*
-4.630*
-1.886
-3.672*

-2.168
-2.159

Log infant mortality rate

Log GDP PC
A Log divorce rate
A Log
A Log
A Log
A Log

marriage rate
Catholic marriage

rate of birth out of wedlock
infant mortality rate

A Log GDP PC

-7.284*

-5.733*
-4.411*
-12.156*
-3.981*

-2.193

-2.261
-3.770*
-4.212*
-3.111*
-2.185
-3.420*
-2.789

*Denotes rejection of unit root at 90 percent critical values with constant and trend from Eviews
version 3.1 (stability of series).

1996, 1997, and 1998 and 0 otherwise (see Appendix A for details). As noted
by Binner and Dnes (2001), these are defined as pulse variables in the
first-differenced divorce and marriage rates; therefore, they are step vari7
ables in the divorce and marriage rates.
B. Stationary and Co-IntegrationAnalysis
All series under consideration are clearly nonstationary and require first
differencing. We also test for co-integration using the Johansen test, but
following Reimers's adjusted critical values to account for the small sample
size.8
Dickey-Fuller and augmented Dickey-Fuller tests are reported in
Table 1. All series have unit roots and require first differencing to render
them stationary, with the possible exception of the rate of birth out of
wedlock, which might require twice differencing (given the small sample, we
opted not to do so since this result may be due to the limited number of
observations). Figures 3 and 4 report the differenced divorce and marriage
rates.
7

Hence, the reform dummies contain Os until the reform and Is afterward in the levels data with
respect to divorce and marriage rates.
'See Reimers (1995).
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Figure 3: First differenced log divorce rate (divorce rate measured per 1,000
of population) 1961-2002.
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Figure 4: First differenced log marriage rate (marriage rate measured per
1,000 of population) 1961-2002.
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Given these results and the possibility of common trends, we test for
co-integration using the Johansen test. We have calculated the vector autoregression estimates for all the endogenous and exogenous variables over
lags 1 to 3. The two dummy variables for divorce law reforms were included
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as exogenous stationary variables; all the other variables were included as
endogenous. We applied the Johansen co-integration test to the vector
auto-regression estimates. It indicates the existence of two co-integrating
equations at a 5 percent significance level for Reimers's adjusted critical
values in all lag specifications (see Table 2 for two-lags interval).
The long-run structural model is presented in Table 3, which reports
the normalized co-integrating coefficients for all endogenous variables. We
see that the divorce rate is positively associated with the rate of birth out of
wedlock, and the marriage rate seems to be positively related to Catholic
marriage rate and GDP per capita, and negatively related to the rate of birth
out of wedlock. The other explanatory variable, the rate of infant mortality,
is not statistically significant. These results suggest that, in terms of long-run
structural effects, divorce and marriage rates are more influenced by social
factors than by technology (in the sense of infant mortality) or economic
growth (with a caveat for the marriage rate).

C. Short-Run Analysis
A vector error-correction model was estimated using the lagged residuals
from the co-integrating equations estimated previously. To choose the
appropriate number of lags, we used the information criteria (Akaike &
Schwartz) by which we selected the model with the smallest information
criterion, as reported in Table 4. The results for the divorce and marriage
rates are provided for a specification with two lags in Table 5.
To assure the appropriateness of the model, we examined the distribution of errors, reported in Figures 5 and 6, and one can see that there is
no serial correlation, a result confirmed by the appropriate statistics." We
plot the actual and estimated divorce and marriage rates in Figures 7 and 8,
where we can examine the predictions of the short-run equations. It can be
seen that the model fits quite well.
Divorce rate seems to be positively affected by marriage rate lagged one
and two periods, the rate of birth out of wedlock lagged one period, and
negatively affected by the Catholic marriage rate and GDP per capita, both

'Other specifications, although econometrically inferior, can be consulted in Coelho and
Garoupa (2004).
"°The Durbin-Watson statistics are 2.16 and 2.26, respectively. See Table 5.
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Estimates,
Error-Correction
Table 3: Vector
Long-Run Analysis: Sample (Adjusted): 1963-2001
Log Divorce Rate

Log MarriageRate

3.0239
(0.454)
5.6339
(2.501)
2.1693
(1.084)
0.7645
(0.438)
-39.9845

0.6247
(2.110)
-0.3067
(-3.063)
0.0651
(0.732)
0.3684
(4.744)
-0.1961

Log Catholic marriage
Log rate of birth out of
wedlock
Log infant mortality rate
Log GDP PC
Constant

Included observations: 39 after adjusting endpoints. Tstatistics
in parentheses. Normalized co-integrating coefficients.

Table 4: Lag Specification; Short-Run Analysis;
Sample: 1960-2002

Akaike AIC
Schwartz SC
Log-likelihood

One Lag

Two Lags

-22.72
-19.43
532.47

-22.48*
-17.61*
552.31

Three Lags
-25.04
-18.58
625.82

*Denotes the best specification according to a given criterion.

lagged one period, and the rate of child mortality lagged one and two
periods. With the exception of GDP per capita, these effects are consistent
with the economic theory of divorce and correspond to higher divorce rates
being essentially the consequence of technological improvement in the
production of children and changes in social norms. The GDP-per-capita
effect is not inconsistent with economic theory (it could just be that an
increase of wealth makes unconstrained redistribution more likely and
therefore it is easier to avoid divorce), but it is certainly surprising, and leads
us to conclude that we would need a measure such as the female average
salary to identify the impact of female labor market participation on divorce
rate.
The dummy variable for the 1975 Divorce Law is statistically significant,
but not the dummy variable for the 1995 Code of Civil Registration. Therefore, our most important finding is that a major reform of divorce law such
as the one in 1975 had a significant positive effect on the divorce rate, but a
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Table 5: Vector Error-Correction Estimates; Short-Run Analysis: Divorce

A Log divorce rate (-1)
A Log divorce rate (-2)
A Log marriage rate (-1)
A Log marriage rate (-2)
A Log Catholic marriage rate (-1)
A Log Catholic marriage rate (-2)
A Log rate of birth out of wedlock (-1)
A Log rate of birth out of wedlock (-2)
A Log GDP PC (-1)
A Log GDP PC (-2)
A Log infant mortality rate (-1)
A Log infant mortality rate (-2)
Constant
Dummy 75
Dummy 95
Lagged residuals co-in. Vector 1
Lagged residuals co-in. Vector 2
r

2

2

Adjusted r
Fstatistic
Log-likelihood
Akaike AIC
Schwartz SC
Durbin Watson DW

A Log Divorce Rate

A Log MarriageRate

-0.2624
(-1.292)
-0.1832
(-1.078)
2.4149*

0.0011
(0.018)
-0.0892*
(-1.76)
0.2577

(3.592)
1.1506*
(2.166)
-5.6235*

(1.285)
0.1667
(1.052)
0.2861

(-2.424)
-1.9961
(-0.714)
2.5798*
(1.90)
-1.3559
(-0.913)
-2.2867*
(-2.774)
-0.1692
(-0.165)
-0.8796*
(-1.757)
-0.8217*
(-1.816)
-0.0315
(-0.302)
0.5741*

(0.413)
1.016
(1.218)
-0.6405*
(-1.581)
-0.8658*
(-1.954)
-0.3084
(-1.254)
0.1088
(0.356)
-0.0956
(-0.639)
-0.0678
(-0.503)
0.0226
(0.726)
0.1669*

(3.504)
-0.0648
(-0.774)
-0.0267

(3.414)
0.011
(0.452)
-0.0086

(-0.524)
-0.3313
(-0.292)
0.8383
0.7208
7.1316
36.322
-0.9909
-0.2657
2.16

(-0.564)
-1.251*
(-3.695)
0.7701
0.6029
4.6057
83.495
-3.41
-2.6849
2.26

*Denotes variables statistically significant (90 percent critical level).
Sample (adjusted): 1963-2001. Included observations: 39 after adjusting endpoints. Tstatistics
in parentheses.
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Residuals of short-run equation with respect to first-differenced

log divorce rate 1963--2001.
0.25
0.2
0.15
01
0.05

-0.05
-0.1
-0.15
-0.2
-0.25
-0.3
Year
I -RESIDUALS

SHORT-RUNEQUATION A LOUDIVORCE RATE

Figure 6: Residuals of short-run equation with respect to first-differenced
log marriage rate 1963-2001.
.08

0.06

0.04
0.02
0.

-0.02
-0.04

-0.06-0.08

Year

I

-

RESIDUALSSHORT-RUNEQUATION A LOG MARRIAGERATE

538

Coelho and Garoupa

Figure 7: Actual and estimated log divorce rates (divorce rates measured
per 1,000 of population) 1964-2002.
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less substantial change such as the one in 1995 does not seem to be statistically important."
The marriage rate is negatively affected by the rate of birth out of
wedlock lagged one and two periods, and divorce rate lagged two periods. All
these effects conform with the economic theory of marriage and highlight
social explanations for the decline of the marriage rate. However, the
explanatory power of this regression is inferior to that of the divorce regression. As before, the dummy variable for the 1975 Divorce Law is statistically
significant, but the dummy variable for the 1995 Code of Civil Registration is
not. Easier divorce rules should have a short-run positive impact on the
marriage rate since the opportunity cost of a marriage mistake has
decreased.

III. CONCLUSION
The major legal change of 1975 had a significant positive effect on the
divorce rate, including a substantial pipeline effect. However, it seems that
making divorces easier to obtain in a no-fault regime (the legal change after
1995) had a minor impact on the divorce rate.
Our observations suggest that the reforms in the 1990s were more the
response of the legislature to growing divorce rates (with substantial litigation costs borne by the government) rather than the cause. Divorce puts a
heavy burden on the court system if reasons for marital breakdown have to
be investigated and fault-based settlements are required. Portuguese judicial
capacity was strained, which increased the demand for procedural revisions.
Our empirical results suggest that an increasing divorce rate could have been
the driving force behind divorce law reforms.
Preliminary evidence concerning divorce lawsuits filed in civil registrars (divorce by mutual agreement) after 1995 seems to follow a pattern not
very different from that of divorce lawsuits filed in courts, further suggesting
that the law reform of 1995 had no substantial effect on divorce rates. In fact,
new legal rules were in effect in 2001 to further alleviate the burden on the
government of divorce litigation costs.

"The growth of the logarithm of the divorce rate was 0.5741 per year due to the introduction
of divorce law in 1975 (Table 5). After calculating the appropriate divorce rate, we get an
increase of 77.56 percent per year in the period 1975-1978. Notice that in Table 5 the coefficients of the explanatory variables are elasticities.
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APPENDIX
Date

A:

DIVORCE LAW

in

Legal Reference

Nov. 3, 1910

Divorce Law (Decree 3)

May 30, 1918

Decrees 4343 and 4431

1940

Concordat with the Holy See

1966

Civil Code

May 27, 1975

New Divorce Law after the
new Concordat Protocol
was agreed on Feb. 15
(Decree 261)

PORTUGAL
Main Observations
Divorce is legally introduced in
Portugal. Fault regime. Divorce
by mutual agreement is
allowed. Separation prior to
divorce by mutual agreement is
not allowed.
Separation prior to divorce by
mutual agreement is allowed.
No divorce for Catholic marriages
(celebrated after Aug. 1, 1940).
Former divorce rules apply to
civil marriages.
Stricter divorce rules for civil
marriages. Divorce by mutual
agreement is subject to
three-year waiting period and
to the approval of ajudge.
Divorce rules are extended to
Catholic marriages. Divorce by
mutual agreement is no longer
subject to the 1966 harsh rules.
No-fault regime becomes
dominant.
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Coelho and Garoupa

Date

Main Observations

Legal Reference

July 17, 1976,
July 24, 1976

Decrees 561 and 605

Nov. 25, 1977

Decree 496

June 6, 1995

New Code of Civil
Registration (Decree 131)

Aug. 10, 1998

Law 47

Oct. 13, 2001

Decree 272

APPENDIX

B:

DATA DEFINITION and SOURCES

VariableName
Divorce rate
Marriage rate
GDP per capita

Rate of birth out of wedlock
Catholic marriage rate
Infant mortality rate

Dummy75

Dummy95

Minor changes concerning
separation prior to divorce by
mutual agreement.
Three years of marriage as
minimum for filing for divorce.
Divorce by mutual agreement can
be filed in civil registrars if
couple has no children or
custody has been judicially
decided.
Minimum duration of marriage
for filing for divorce is
eliminated. Other rules
concerning divorce litigation
are relaxed.
Divorce by mutual agreement can
be filed only in civil registrars.

Definition

Source

Divorce per 1,000 of population,
1960-2002
Marriage per 1,000 of population
1960-2002
Gross domestic product per capita
(1,000 PTE, 1990 constant prices)
1960-2002
Births out of wedlock per 1,000 of
total births 1960-2002
Percentage of marriages celebrated
by Catholic Church 1960-2002
Infants dead per 1,000 of total
infants (infant: less than one year
old) 1960-2002
Dummy for 1975 reform of Divorce
Law, with 1 in 1975, 1976, 1977, &
1978 and 0 otherwise
Dummy for 1995 reform of Divorce
Law, with 1 in 1995, 1996, 1997, &
1998 and 0 otherwise

Instituto Nacional de
Estatfstica (INE)
INE
INE

INE
INE
INE

